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# DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIA REVIEW
COMPLETED



# SPECIAL REPORT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY (U) AUGUST 1965

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#### (U) THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY

SAO/AP-1-630-1-4-65 INT

August 1965


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#### FOREWORD

- (S) The purpose of this report is to describe the present potential of the Chinese Communist Navy and the efforts being exerted to make it a major naval force. Following the Sino-Soviet rift in August 1960, the naval construction programs of the Chinese Communist Navy apparently were brought to a standstill. Recent evidence suggests that they were reactivated, or at least given new impetus, in mid-1962. In the past nine months we have discovered that the Chinese Communists have built or assembled a "G"-class ballistic missile submarine, have built an "R"-class submarine and have continued their "W"-class submarine construction program. We know that they have one "Osa" and one "Komar" guided missile patrol boats, and possibly more; and that they have built a modern submarine tender, and that they are actively constructing and modernizing numbers of other naval craft. The conclusion is obvious that as soon as a missile. becomes available for the "G"-class ballistic missile submarine, China will pose a significant naval, as well as psychological threat to all Asian countries. It would be naive to assume that its ambitions will be satisfied at that point.
  - 2. (S) This report is based on a briefing which was presented to a number of audiences at the Pentagon during the late summer of 1965. In preparing it for publication, it has been updated, and relevant all-source material has been added. It is now being distributed to selected addressees as a matter of intelligence interest.



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- 1. (S) The Chinese Communist Navy now ranks as the largest and the fastest growing naval force in the Far East, and includes the fourth largest submarine force in the world, totalling some 32 units. It comprises over 1,000 ships, is supported by a well established shore organization, and has a personnel strength of 76,500 including 14,500 in the naval air arm.
- 2. (S) Although the 32 submarines give it a significant offensive potential, the CCN is primarily a coastal defense force. It is capable of conducting motor torpedo boat, mine laying and mine-sweeping operations. It has an amphibious troop lift capability of landing two infantry divisions (28,000 personnel), and its naval air arm, equipped with land based planes, can conduct air attacks in support of naval operations.
- 3. (S) Fleets and Major Bases. The CCN is organized into three fleets; North, East and South Sea, with National Naval Headquarters located in Peiping. The majority of major combatants, and all of the submarine force, are assigned to the North and East Sea Fleets. The South Sea Fleet is primarily a patrol-surveillance and logistical support organization.

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4. (S) The following bases are of major significance in the Chinese Navy:

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Dairen	Wusung		Swatow
Lushun	Shanghai	-	Huang-pu
Tsingtao	Ting Hai	•	Chan-Chiang
		• .	Yulin

5. (S) There exist also 10 bases of lesser importance which provide logistic support to fleet units as well as serving as home ports for patrol units and Off-Shore Defense Force Ships.

6. (S) The CCN is a havy made up of many different ship types. Some

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others are of Soviet design, either given directly to China by the Soviets, or assembled in China using Soviet components and technical assistance; still others are of strictly ChiCom design and construction. Recent photography of many of these ships and their equipment, reflects an unusually good material condition. Personnel observed conducting shipboard gun mount drills, awaiting personnel inspection, or paraded at quarters as the ship stands out of port, all reflect a smart, taut, well disciplined attitude. While the above are only outward manifestations, they nonetheless are important indicators of training, policy and doctrine.

7. (S) Shipbuilding and Modernization Program. The CCN is now embarked on an ambitious shipbuilding and modernization program. High priority is placed on the construction of submarines. Two and possibly 3 shippards are involved. "W" and/or "R" submarines are probably being

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
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built in Wuchang Shipyard, 600 n.m. up the Yangtze, and in Kiangnan Shipyard, in Shanghai. Lu Ta Shipyard in Dairen built the first ChiCom "G" Class ballistic missile submarine, and will probably construct the follow-on hull if one is built. The "G" Class SSB, first observed in November 64 at Pier 4 of the commercial harbor in Dairen, is still fitting out there. It is not known when she will become operational, but possibly by early fall. To date no missile is known to be available for this unit.

- 8. (S) The ChiComs are also building minesweepers. Recent information and ground photography revealed these units in Shanghai. Prior to August 1964, ships of this type were not known to exist. The Naval Order of Battle for this type had been constant for years, but now reflects a total of 63 minesweepers, including 24 of the new type. This is significant.
- 9. (S) Reports by maritime sources when they enter ports throughout China, refer to 20, 30, 40 even up to 50-100 trawler-minesweepers of the type illustrated. (p.10) These ships have been observed conducting minesweeping operations, but may also have a dual assignment as trawlers. To date these units have not been added to the NOB, as their specific functions and numbers have not yet been resolved.

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- 10. (S) "Shanghai" Class fast patrol boats are being built in Dairen. These are excellent, high-speed units, 130' long, with one 57 mm. mount forward and one dual 37 mm. mount aft, torpedo tubes and sonar. They can be used for all types of patrol/coastal surveillance missions.

  Exactly how many the Chinese have produced is unknown. The 1 July 1965 NOB carried 24 Shanghai's, 12 each located in the North and East Sea Fleets. However, recent information indicates that 7 units have been added to the South Sea Fleet; 4 stationed in Hai-kou and 3 in Canton. While the addition of these 7 ships does not significantly increase the South Sea Fleet naval order of battle, it does indicate that the ChiComs are beefing-up the strength of this fleet to meet the growing threat of the vietnam situation, and that they consider the "Shanghai" Class PTF a useful component of this effort.
- 11. (S) The P-4, P-6, and possibly a new Chinese version of a more sophisticated motor torpedo boat, are being built. There are a total of 178 of these units. They are deployed in all 3 fleet areas, and provide the CCN with a significant offensive and defensive capability.
- 12. (S) Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai is building naval auxiliaries up to 4000 tons. Seven medium-size naval tankers have been built or are building there. These units have been identified by photography and appear to be of modern design. The addition of these units to the navy is most important, and points out the ChiComs concern for improving their logistical capabilities. To date we have no evidence that the ChiComs have an at-sea replenishment capability.
- 13. (S) The submarine tender illustrated was recently built in Hutung. This unit originally carried pendant number 6202, but that number has been changed to 329. The tender is 330 long, beam,

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18' draft and displaces 4,000 tons. It has 4 heavy duty turret-type cranes, an open well deck for handling submarine equipment and armament, including torpedoes, and associated workship areas typical of submarine tenders. It is armed with 2-37mm open turrets and 4-25mm over-under turrets. This unit provides the CCN with mobile workshop and logistical support for her submarines, in areas removed from major naval bases. The ship illustrated was sighted on 30 April 1965 operating off the ChouShan Island area in company with a "W" Class submarine. This possible training or operational exercise may indicate that the tender is readying for deployment, possibly to the South Sea Fleet. Whithin the past month, submarines have also been noted by COMINT conducting exercises in the East Sea Fleet area in company has also revealed with a submarine associated auxiliary vessel. that up to five submarines have been conducting operations in the Choushan Island area over the last year. This is three more than ever previously observed. The significance of this is yet to be determined. Meanwhile it is of "watch" importance.

15. (S) Recent intelligence which could be highly significant is the sighting of the cruiser Peiching in Hsinkang (northern end, Gulf of Chihli). This ship is the ex-British cruiser Aurora, given to the Chinese Nationalists in 1948. The Chi Nats renamed it the Chunking, and in February 1949, the ship with her full crew embarked, defected to the Chinese Communists. The ship was sunk in the North China port of Hulutao by Chi Nat bombers and for some months lay capsized on the harbor bottom. She was refloated and towed to Dairen for repair or scrapping. Reports in 1959 indicated that the cruiser had been moved to Shanghai and was tied up in the

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
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Whangpoo River above International Settlement. A sighting report on 1 June 1965 stated that the cruiser was observed being towed downstream in the Whangpoo River, Shanghai; her status and destination unknown. The recent reports from Hsinkang indicate that the ship is being worked on, the hull is newly painted and in excellent condition, and the ChiComs are apparently refitting the ship. If this is in fact what the ChiComs are doing, it would provide them with a ship possessing good fire-power, and one useful for showing the flag.

16. All the foregoing bears out the fact that the Chinese Navy is on the move -- modernizing, building, training, expanding.

indicates that training is conducted with some regularity. In April, 1965, two "Riga" class destroyer escorts, one HASHIDATE class patrol escort, and one "Kaibokan II" class patrol escort conducted firing training and single ship exercises. During the same period two "Kronshtadt" class submarine chasers conducted sonar drills and several IST and ISM type amphibious units engaged in undetermined type activity. Exercises of this type are not isolated instances, and have increased significantly during 1964-65.

17. (S) South Sea Fleet. Of particular interest because of its proximity to the conflict in Southeast Asia is the South Sea Fleet area which includes Hainan Island and the Gulf of Tonkin. The threat to U.S. Naval forces in the area are presently the CCN motor torpedo boat squadrons located at Yulin and Chinglan on Hainan Island, and the 7 MTB's based in Canton. Each squadron is made up of at least twelve units. Both P-4 and P-6 class MTB's are available for use, the former armed with 18 inch torpedoes, the same ships and armament



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as utilized by the North Vietnamese Navy against U.S. naval units in the Gulf of Tonkin engagement in August 1964. Any attack launched by CCN PT boats will be executed with more finesse, in greater numbers, and will undoubtedly be pressed home with more vigor than that previously displayed by the North Vietnamese attackers.

- 18. (S) Should the Chinese Communists decide that the situation in S.E. Asia warrants submarine deployment to these areas, it is estimated that they might send up to 40% of their "W" Class submarines south. Detailed information on CCN submarine operations is lacking, making it difficult to assess their combat readiness, and to estimate the route these submarines would take from the North and East Sea Fleets on their transit south. We feel that the operation of submarines for over ten years must have given the CCN submariner some degree of proficiency above mediocrity, and that he could make the southward transit to the east of Taiwan, avoiding shipping lanes and maintaining electronic silence. There is a good chance that the transit could be made undetected.
- to the South Sea Fleet. The most logical base for submarines deploying to that area is Yulin, on the southern tip of Hainan Island. It is interesting to note during WWII. The well-protected port provides access to deep water for submarine operations, and is strategically located to provide ready access to the Gulf of Tonkin and the waters off South Vietnam. It would be expected that the submarine tender previously shown, would also deploy to this area, to provide logistical and repair

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19. (S) For some time analysts have expected submarine deployment

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
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
support to the operating submarines. Assuming eight submarines are deployed to this area, it is estimated that the CCN could keep four submarines on station within a radius of about 925 miles of Yulin, on a continuous basis. This would complicate the already complex problem of logistic supply to our forces in South Vietnam. As a matter of interest, the mouth of the Mekong River, serving Saigon, is only 525 nautical miles by sea from Yulin.


- 20. (S) Conclusions. It can be expected that the Chinese Navy will continue its rapid naval expansion by the phasing out of obsolete ships (these in the case of the CCN may be very old indeed); by modernization and timely overhaul of existing units; and through continuance of its ambitious shipbuilding programs, with emphasis on submarines.
- 21. (U) As the Chinese Navy adds to its experience and introduces newer units into its order of battle, it will no doubt gain the confidence and combat readiness which are expected of a naval power.
- 22. (S) To sum up, the Chinese Communist Navy is a potential threat to Asia and U.S. naval forces deployed there. It is evolving into a modernized navy capable of exerting significant influence in Asia, and its development, deployment and increasing operational capabilities are being closely followed.

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






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